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Case Comment
FEDERAL SECURITIES REGULATION--STANDARD OF CARE REQUIRED UNDER
SECTION 14(A) AND RULE 14A-9 OF THE 1934 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
Acr-The United States District Court for the District of Delaware
has held, using a negligence standard, that an individual who violated
section 14(a) of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act and rule 14a-9
promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission governing
proxy solicitations is liable for monetary damages caused by such viola-
tions if he knew or should have known that the proxy materials were
false or misleading.
Gould v. American Hawaiian Steamship Co., 351 F Supp. 853
(D. Del. 1972).
During January and February of 1969, Malcolm McLean, president
and member of the board of directors of McLean Industries, negotiated
with the R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company' (Reynolds) regarding the
prospects of merging the two companies.2 Despite an early breakdown
in these negotiations, both sides ultimately agreed to merge McLean
Industries into Reynolds.8 Reynolds offered one share of its $2.25 con-
vertible preferred stock for each share of McLean Industries common
stock. Instead of the Reynolds stock, however, some of the McLean
Industries shareholders, including the defendants Mr. Ludwig and Mr.
Kroger, received $50 cash for each of their shares of McLean Industries
common stock.4 The board of directors of McLean Industries, includ-
ing Mr. Ludwig and Mr. Kroger, unanimously approved the merger.
A proxy statement, with a two-page letter from Mr. McLean, was
1. Hereinafter referred to as Reynolds.
2. Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 319 F. Supp. 795, 798-99 (D. Del. 1970).
Reynolds' first offer consisted of $40 principal amount, 20 year, 7 per cent Reynolds
debtenture, and five/eighths of warrant to purchase Reynolds common stock at $47.50 per
share. Malcom McLean valued this offer at $50 per share. However, Mr. Ludwig and Mr.
Casey, directors of McLean Industries, and representing corporate stockholders of McLean
Industries, refused Reynolds stock but agreed to $50 cash per share.
3. Id. at 799.
4. Id. The McLean Industries shareholders who received the $50 cash per share were
Litton Industries Inc., Monroe International Corporate Retirement Plan (a Litton pension
fund), National Bulk Carriers Inc. (owned solely by Mr. Ludwig), American Hawaiian
Steamship Co., and Hal Kroger, chairman of the board of directors of American Hawaiian




mailed to McLean Industries shareholders to inform them of the
merger and to solicit their approval. Sixty-seven per cent of the share-
holders approved the merger. 5
Plaintiff Gould6 instituted a class action suit pursuant to rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure7 on behalf of the McLean Indus-
tries common shareholders who did not receive the $50 each, and
who were not members of the board of directors of McLean Indus-
tries.8 Gould challenged the merger on four counts. Count II charged
that the McLean proxy materials were false and misleading in viola-
tion of section 14(a) of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act and rule
14a-9 promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission.9
Seeking to recover monetary damages caused by the false and mis-
leading proxy solicitation, plaintiff brought this class action suit
against the McLean Industries directors who participated in the proxy
5. Id. at 795-800. The most important of the alleged misstatements was to the effect
that the favored defendants "have agreed to vote for the merger. Id. at 800. The favored
defendants owned 64 per cent of the stock of McLean Industries. Sixty-seven per cent was
needed to approve the merger. The court found that the defendants never agreed to vote
for the merger. A shareholder who read that 64 per cent had already agreed to vote for
merger requiring approval by 67 per cent might conclude that the merger is foregone
conclusion and not bother to vote.
6. Id. at 797. Gould was the executor of the estate of former stockholder of McLean
Industries. Intervening plaintiffs were also former stockholders of McLean Industries.
7. FED. R. Civ. P 23 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Prerequisites to Class Action. One or more members of class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical
of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.
See generally Kalven & Rosenfield, Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L.
R v. 864 (1941); Comment, Adequate Representation, Notice, and the New Class Action
Rule: Effectuating Remedies Prowded by the Securities Laws, 116 U. PA. L. Rav. 889
(1968); Note, Class Action Treatment of Securities Fraud Suits Under Revised Rule 23, 36
.GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1150 (1968).
8. 319 F. Supp. at 797.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970) provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of national securities ex-
change or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or con-
sent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted security)
registered pursuant to section 781 of this title.
SEC Reg., 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-9 (1972) provides:
(a) No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any proxy
statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication, written or
oral, containing any statement which, at the time and in the light of the circum-
stances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any matenal
fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make the state-
ments therein not false or misleading or necessary to correct any statement in any
earlier communication with respect to the solicitation of proxy for the same meeting
or subject matter which has become false or misleading.
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solicitation and those McLean Industries shareholders who received
the "favored treatment" of $50 cash per share.10 Claiming that the
proxies were false and misleading as a matter of law plaintiff moved
for summary judgment on the issue of liability" Defendants denied
that the proxy materials were false or misleading and argued that even
if the proxy materials were false or misleading, the misstatements and
omissions were immaterial as a matter of law Defendants moved for
summary judgment. 12 The court, in concluding that the issue of ade
quacy of disclosure presented a triable issue, denied both litigants'
motions for summary judgment.'"
Plaintiff and defendants, however, renewed their respective motions
for summary judgment before the same district court.1 4 Relying on
Mills v. Electrzc Auto-Lte Co.' 5 as the standard for materiality the
court concluded that the proxy materials omitted statements necessary
to correct the proxy materials and contained false and misleading state-
ments.16 The district court granted plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment on the issue of liability against several individual defend-
ants.1
7
10. 319 F. Supp. at 797-98. Plaintiff withdrew his request that the merger be set aside.
Defendants were Reynolds, McLean Industries, members of the board of McLean Indus-
tries, and the McLean shareholders who received the $50 cash per share.
II. Id. at 800.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 808, 811. The court defined the issues as: (1) were the statements false? (2)
were the omitted statements necessary to correct the proxy materials? and (3) were the
misstatements and omissions material? These are the most frequently litigated issues in
suits involving section 14(a) and rule 14a-9. See L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 916-17
(1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss]. See generally Note, Proxy Statements, 3 GEORGIA L. REV.
163, 173-89 (1968).
14. Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 331 F Supp. 981 (D. Del. 1971).
15. 396 U.S. 375 (1970). The shareholders of Electric Auto-Lite Inc. sought to have the
merger set aside and to obtain other relief. The district court held that causation was
proven since the claimed defects were material. 281 F. Supp. 286 (N.D. Ill. 1967). The court
of appeals held that it would decide the issue of causation by inquiring into whether the
merger was fair. 403 F2d 429 (7th Cir. 1968). Rejecting the fairness test, the United States
Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals. The Court also rejected the
common law test of reliance upon the misstatements, and held that if the shareholder
proves the defect was material then sufficient showing of causation has been established.
Materiality was defined as:
If the defect was of such character that it might have been considered important by
reasonable shareholder who was in the process of deciding how to vote.
396 U.S. at 384.
For an analysis of Mills, see Note, Causation and Liability tn PrIvate Actions for Proxy
Violations, 80 YALE L.J. 107 (1970).
16. 331 F. Supp. at 986.
17. Id. at 986-98. The defendants found liable were: (1) Malcom McLean, chairman of
the board of directors of McLean Industries, and its chief owner; (2) Hal Kroger, member
of the board of directors of McLean Industries; (3) Daniel K. Ludwig, member of the
board of directors of McLean Industries, and sole owner of National-Bulk Industries, which
owned Berkshire Industries, Inc., which owned 90 per cent of American Hawaiian Steam-
920
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Two of the individuals found liable, Ludwig and Kroger, applied
by motion to the same district court for an order vacating the ruling
granting summary judgment.18 They claimed that the court used an
incorrect legal standard to hold them liable for a violation of section
14(a) and rule 14a-9 governing proxy solicitations. 9 Ludwig and Kro-
ger contended that to hold an individual liable for monetary damages
the court must find that the individual acted with scienter.20 In the
alternative, defendants claimed that they should be allowed at a trial
to prove they acted in good faith.21 Thus, they would be liable only
if they distributed the proxy materials knowing such materials were
false or misleading. Defendants further claimed that the record did
not support a finding of scienter.22
The district court ordered the litigants to submit briefs for argument
on the issue of which standard of care is required under section 14(a)
and rule 14a-9 in a civil suit by a shareholder seeking to recover
monetary damages.23 Reynolds argued for a negligence standard: de-
fendants should be liable if they knew or should have known of the
misstatements and omissions. In addition, Reynolds claimed that the
record did support a finding that the individual defendants acted with
sclenter.2 4 Plaintiff argued that the standard of care should be absolute
ship Co., which owned 0.4 per cent of the common stock of McLean Industries; and (4)
Joseph T. Casey, member of the board of directors of McLean Industries.
18. Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853, 856 (D. Del. 1972).
19. Id. The court's opinion does not disclose the standard used. The court did find that
Casey, Ludwig, Kroger, and Malcolm McLean knew that the proxy statements were untrue.
331 F Supp. at 998. In the present opinion, the court stated that the defendants knew the
statements were false but that they did not read the proxy materials; therefore, they did
not know that the proxy materials were false or misleading.
20. Scienter is derived from the Latin sczo, meaning to know, to understand, to per-
ceive, and to have knowledge of. HAUmRl's LATIN DICTIONARY 1643 (1882). Defendants de-
fined scienter as (1) conduct evidencing an intent to deceive; or (2) actual knowledge of
the falsity of the proxy materials; or (3) conduct amounting to gross negligence or reckless-
ness. 351 F. Supp. at 857. By applying the defendants' definition of scienter, the court could
have held that the failure to read the proxy materials amounted to gross negligence or
reckless conduct. Considering the gravity of the harm flowing from the false information,
and the requirement of section 14(a) and rule 14a-9 that an accurate statement be given,
and that the directors held a position of fiduciary trust towards the shareholders, these
factors balanced against the necessary conduct (reading of the proxy materials) could
mandate a conclusion of gross negligence. See W PaossER, LAw OF TORTS 700-01 (4th ed.
1971); Green, Deceit, 16 VA. L. REv. 749, 752 (1930); Keeton, Fraud: Necessity for an Intent
to Decewe, 5 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 583 (1958).
21. 351 F. Supp. at 857. Defendants argued that the only difference between scienter
and good faith is the burden of proof. If scienter is required, plaintiff has to prove de-
fendants acted with scienter. If good faith is required, defendants have to prove they
acted in good faith. The difference is the burden of going forward with the evidence. Ac
cording to defendants, good faith is the same as the absence of scienter.
22. Id. But see the discussion in note 19 supra.
23. Id. at 856.
24. Id. at 857; see the discussion in note 19 supra.
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liability- any person who solicited proxies, or allowed his name to be
used in a proxy solicitation, or approved the solicitation, would be
liable to a shareholder who suffered an injury due to the solicitation
if the materials were false or misleading.25
The United States Supreme Court in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak 2 6 held
that shareholders who received false or misleading proxy materials in
violation of section 14(a) could sue those responsible for the proxy solic
itation. The Court stated that the federal courts have the power to grant
all the necessary remedies for such a violation. According to the Borak
Court, the purpose of section 14(a) is:
To prevent management or others from obtaining authorization
for corporate action by means of deceptive or inadequate disclo-
sure in a proxy solicitation.27
The purpose of section 14(a) reflected congressional concern over the
importance of supplying shareholders with accurate information. 28 The
major premise behind section 14(a) is that a shareholder must know
the truth about the choices on which he is asked to vote. Voting by proxy
is the only practical method for most shareholders to effectively partici-
pate in the affairs of the corporation they "own." 29 To participate
25. Id. at 857.
26. 377 U.S. 426 (1964). Shareholders of J.i. Case Co. brought civil action in federal
court for deprivation of their preemptive rights due to the merger of J.I. Case Co. and
American Tractor Corp., allegedly effected through the use of a false and misleading
proxy solicitation. The district court held that it could grant only declarative relief. The
court of appeals reversed, holding that the court had the power to grant remedial relief.
The Supreme Court held that violation of section 14(a) gives rise to private cause
of action for damages and that the federal courts have the power to grant all the neces-
sary relief. See Elson, The Meaning of JI. Case Co. v. Borak, Remedies Available for
Violations of Proxy Rules Under the Federal Securities Acts. 23 Sw. L.J. 609 (1969); Com-
ment, Prtvate Rights and Federal Remedies, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1150 (1965); Note, Imply-
ing Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HAiv. L. REv. 285 (1963); Note,
Private Remedies from Federal Statutes: Towards Rational Use of Borak, 63 Nw.
U.L. REv. 454 (1968).
27. 377 U.S. at 431.
28. Id. Cf. Knauss, A Reappraisal of Disclosure, 62 MICH. L. Rxv. 607 (1964).
29. See Emerson & Latcham, SEC Proxy Regulations: Steps Toward More Effective
Stockholder Participation, 59 YALE L.J. 635 (1950), which states:
The only opportunity for effective participation m the corporate affairs of large,
modern corporation is the exercise of the right to vote by proxy.
Loss, supra note 13, at 528, states:
The widespread distribution of corporate securities, with concomitant separation
of ownership and management puts the entire concept of the stockholders' meeting
at the mercy of the proxy instrument. This makes the proxy tremendous force for
good or evil in our economic scheme. Unregulated, it is an open invitation to self-
perpetuation and irresponsibility of management. Properly circumscribed, it may
well turn out to be the solution of the modern corporate system.
See Bernstein & Fisher, The Regulation of the Solicitation of Proxies: Some Reflections on
Corporate Democracy, 7 U. CHi. L. REv. 226 (1940).
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effectively this right to vote must be protected. Section 14(a) and rule
14a-9 do this by requiring that those who solicit proxies must supply
accurate statements and correct any statement which later becomes
false or misleading. Borak, though, did not discuss what elements are
necessary for the cause of action.
In Mills v. Electrzc Auto-Ltte Co., 0 the Supreme Court re-empha-
sized the importance of corporate suffrage. Mills held that the use of
a proxy solicitation which is materially false or misleading is a violation
of section 14(a) and rule 14a-9.81 Like Borak, Mills did not discuss
which standard of care should apply to individuals responsible for a
false or misleading proxy solicitation. Mills, however, did discuss one
of the elements of the cause of action: materiality of the misstatements
and omissions. The Mills Court held that courts should not apply the
common law test of whether the injured party relied on the misrepre-
sentation. Rather, the courts should apply an objective test: whether
the misstatements and omissions are material. If they are material the
requirement of the causal connection between the proxy solicitation
and the injury is satisfied. 2
Since the Borak holding in 1964 that a cause of action exists, most
of the cases involving violations of section 14(a) have dealt with issues
such as damages, causal connection between the proxy solicitation and
the damages, and the meaning of materiality.3 The issue presented in
this case has never been squarely faced by other courts.
The district court framed the issue as: in light of the policy of
section 14(a) and rule 14a-9 favoring corporate suffrage by requiring
disclosure of accurate information, if an individual violates section
14(a) and rule 14a-9, which standard of care-negligence, scienter, or
absolute liability-should be applied to determine if he is lialfle for
monetary damages to a shareholder injured by the violation?34
ABSOLUTE LIABiLITY
Agreeing with plaintiff's claim that strict liability would protect
shareholders by allowing recovery for damages caused by a false or mis-
leading proxy solicitation, the court nevertheless rejected absolute lia-
30. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
31. Id. at 384-85.
32. id. See the discussion at note 15 supra.
33. See Loss, supra note 13, at 916-17.
34. 351 F Supp. at 855-59.
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bility because absolute liability would not fulfill the "other purposes"
of the Securities Acts. 5 These "other purposes" formed the rationale
for the decision to choose negligence. 0 The court stated:
When possible the liability sections should be interpreted to afford
incentives to directors to undertake active and rigorous scrutiny
of corporate activities, and should not be construed to make such
efforts of no significance in precluding liability for misstatements
against which a director cannot reasonably protect.8 7
Absolute liability was rejected by the court because it would deter
directors from carefully scrutinizing the proxy materials. According to
the court, this effect on the conduct of directors would not further the
disclosure goal of section 14(a) and rule 14a-9. The court did not dis-
cuss why absolute liability would have such an effect. It reasoned that
holding directors liable regardless of how careful they acted, as long
as the proxy materials were false or misleading, would not further the
disclosure policy. The court assumed that such an effect would result;
it failed to cite any data to support such an assumption.
The court did not indicate what remedy, if any, would be available
if the violation was not the result of scienter or negligence. Presumably
in such a situation the directors will not be personally liable for mone
tary damages, although an injunction may be issued to enjoin the vot-
ing of the illegally obtained proxies.38
SCIENTER
Ludwig and Kroger made three arguments in support of a scienter
standard. First, defendants pointed out that rule 14a-9 and rule lOb-5
(2) are similarly worded.89 The language of these two rules is directed
35. Id. at 858-59.
36. Id. at 859.
37. Id. (emphasis added).
38. See J.I. Case Co., v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 435 (1964); Loss, supra note 13, at 932-56.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970). This section is popularly known as section 10(b) of the 1934
Securities and Exchange Act. The 1934 Securities and Exchange Act is hereinafter referred
to as the 1934 Act or the 1934 Exchange Act. Section 10(b) states in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or any security regis-
tered on national securities exchange or any security not registered, any manipu-
lative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regula-
tions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
SEC Reg., 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972), popularly known as rule lob-5 states:
924
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towards the veracity of a statement, not the actor s conduct. From this,
they argued that the two rules should be similary interpreted. De-
fendants made this argument because some courts had required proof
of scienter in a lOb-5 suit.40 The court agreed that similar language
was used, but felt that this does not mean both rules must be similarly
interpreted. According to the court, each rule must be interpreted to
fulfill the purposes for which it was enacted. Section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 were enacted as general anti-fraud statutes which can conceivably
cover almost every type of socurities fraud.41 Because of section lOb s
breadth (section 10(b) overlaps with several other sections of the Securi-
ties Acts of 1933 and 1934) some courts have required a more strin-
gent standard, such as scienter.42 Section 14(a) and rule 14a-9, however,
are limited to only one type of securities fraud: a false or misleading
proxy solicitation.43 Therefore, the court reasoned, this limited but
important purpose of section 14(a) should not be restricted by adopting
a standard of conduct which was designed for another section. The
court concluded that the analysis must focus on the purpose of each
section, not on the similarity of words. According to the court, scienter
would not further the goal of full disclosure; therefore, the court re-
jected the argument that section 14(a) should require scienter because
section 10(b) may require It.4 4 Defendants' argument, however, points
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) T employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) T make any untrue statement of material fact or to omit to state material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) T engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as fraud or deceit upon any person.
40. There is disagreement among the circuits and the commentators over whether
scienter is required in civil action for damages under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. See
Bucklo, Screnter and Rule lOb-5, 67 Nw. L. REv. 562 (1972); Comment, Scienter in Prvate
Damages Actions Under lOb-5, 57 GEo. L.J. 1108 (1969). The major reason for requiring
scienter in lOb-5 suit is that lOb-5 can cover the same misconduct proscribed by section
12 of the 1933 Securities Act (hereinafter referred to as the 1933 Act). Section 12 (15
U.S.C §771 (1970)) has a short statute of limitations and required only negligence, not
scienter. If iOb-5 is applied to protect buyers (section 12 is for the protection of buyers) by
requiring negligence instead of scienter, and different statute of limitations, then section
12 would be judicially nullified. For discussion of this, see Comment, Sctenter and Rule
10b-5, 69 COLUM. L. Rxv. 1057 (1963); Comment, Negligent Misrepresentation Under Rule
1~b-5, 32 U. CH. L. REv. 824 (1965). For a suggestion that the words scienter and negli-
gence be discarded, see Mann, Rule 10b-5: Evolution of Continuum of Conduct to Re-
place the Catch Phrases of Negligence and Scsenter, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1206 (1970).
41. 351 F. Supp. at 860-61. See Loss, supra note 13, at 1427-29.
42. See the discussion in note 40 supra.
43. See the discussion in note 26 supra.
44. 351 F. Supp. at 868.
925
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out an inconsistency in the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934. For ex-
ample, assuming there is a false or misleading proxy solicitation, a
shareholder injured by it can sue under either section 10(b), section
14(a) or both.45 If he sues under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 he may
have to prove that defendants acted with scienter" but, if he sues under
section 14(a) and rule 14a-9 it may be sufficient to prove that defen-
dants acted negligently. The prohibited conduct (a false or misleading
proxy solicitation) is the same in both suits, yet it is treated differently
under the two sections.
Second, defendants claimed that section 18(a) of the 1934 Securities
and Exchange Act applies, therefore they should be given a chance at
trial to prove they acted in good faith.46 Defendants defined good
faith as the absence of scienter. 47 Section 18(a) provides that any person
who files with the Securities and Exchange Commission a false or mis-
leading document is liable to an individual who, in reliance on such
document, purchases or sells a security affected by the document, as-
suming there are damages. Section 18(a), however, allows the.person
who filed the document to avoid liability if he acted in good faith.48 It
is mandatory that proxy materials be filed with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, 49 and minority shareholders in a merger have
been classified as sellers.50 Thus, the first two provisions of section 18(a)
45. Accord, SEC v. National Securities, 393 U.S. 453 (1969) (rule lOb-5 applies to mis-
statements in the proxy material).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1970), popularly known as section 18(a) of the 1934 Act. Section
18(a) provides in part:
(a) Any person who shall make or cause to be made any statement in any application,
report, or document filed pursuant to this chapter or any rule or regulation there-
under or any undertaking contained in registration statement as provided in sub-
section (d) of section 78o of this title, which statement was at the time and in the light
of the circumstances under winch it was made false or misleading with respect to
any material fact, shall be liable to any person (not knowing that such statement was
false or misleading) who, in reliance upon such statement, shall have purchased or
sold security at price which was affected by such statement, for damages caused
by such reliance, unless the person sued shall prove that he acted in good faith and
had no knowledge that such statement was false or misleading
(c) No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under this section
unless brought within one year after discovery of the facts constituting the cause of
action and within three years after such cause of action accrued.
47. See the discussion in note 21 supra.
48. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1970).
49. SEC Reg., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6 (1972), provides in relevant part:
(a) Five preliminary copies of the proxy statement and form of proxy and any other
soliciting material to be furnished to security holders concurrently therewith shall
be filed with the Commission at least 10 days prior to the date definitive copies of
such material are first sent or given to security holders, or such shorter period prior
to that date as the Commission may authorize upon showing of good cause there-
of
50. SEC v. National Securities, 393 U.S. 453, 459 (1969) (stockholders' exchange of stock
926
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are satisfied. If the court would have applied section 18(a) the issue
would have been whether the directors' failure to read the proxy
materials constituted acting in good faith. The district court, in an
earlier opinion, found that the defendants knew that the statements
were false or misleading, and would have known that the proxy ma-
terials were false or misleading if they would have read the proxy
materials before the materials were sent to the shareholders.51 It was
possible, therefore, to hold the defendants liable by concluding that
they did not act in good faith because they failed to read the proxy
materials sent to the shareholders. The court could have reasoned that
the directors, as fiduciaries, had a duty to check the materials mailed
to the shareholders, especially since these materials related to a merger.
The court, however, was not faced with the necessity of determining
the meaning of good faith because it held that the liability provisions
of section 18(a) do not apply to proxy solicitations. Citing the para-
mount importance of corporate suffrage, the court held that liability
under section 14(a) should be governed only by reference to section
14(a), not by reference to either section 18(a) or section 10(b). 52
The district court's reasoning overlooked the clear language of
section 18(a). Section 18(a) applies to all documents filed with the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission. 3 The filing of proxy materials is
required.54 Therefore, should not the liability provisions of section
18(a) apply? The effect of the court's decision is that proxy materials
still have to be filed, but they are not subject to the liability provisions
of section 18(a). Reasoning that the policy of full and accurate dis-
closure embodied in section 14(a) overrides the liability provisions of
section 18(a), the district court carved out a judicial exemption for
proxy materials from the liability provisions of section 18(a).
Even if the court would have applied section 18(a) there is a problem
with the words "in reliance upon such a statement." Section 18(a) re
quires this reliance 5 5 but the Supreme Court in Mills rejected the
requirement of reliance in actions brought under section 14(a).5 6
for stock in the new company resulting from the merger constituted purchase or sale
within the meaning of 10(b) and rule lOb-5). Section 18(a) uses words similar to 10(b) (pur-
chase or sale).
51. See the discussion in note 19 supra.
52. 351 F. Supp. at 861-63.
53. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1970).
54. SEC Reg., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6 (1972).
55. Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 911-15 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. dented, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
56. See the discussion in note 15 supra.
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The defendants' third argument was based on the proposition that
liability under the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act is premised on
scienter. They argued that the 1933 Securities Act and the 1934 Ex-
change Act comprise a uniform scheme of regulation. Section 11 and
section 12 of the 1933 Securities Act base liability on negligence.
5T
Section 9 of the 1934 Exchange Act requires a wilful violation, while
section 18(a) of the 1934 Exchange Act provides for the defense of
good faith.58 From this the defendants conclude that Congress intended
liability under the 1934 Exchange Act to be based upon proof of
scienter.59 The court dismissed this argument by stating that because
Congress acted in a certain manner in section 9 and section 18(a) of
the 1934 Exchange Act does not mean that Congress intended all the
sections of the 1934 Exchange Act to be interpreted according to sec
tion 9 and section 18(a). According to the court, following defendants'
reasoning would lead to a conclusion that since Congress expressly pro-
vided for civil liability in section 9 and section 18(a), only those two
sections of the 1934 Exchange Act can give rise to a cause of action for
damages. The courts, however, have held that violations of section
10(b) and section 14(a) of the 1934 Exchange Act give rise to a cause
of action for damages. 60 However, as previously discussed, this reason-
ing overlooks the language of section 18(a) of the 1934 Exchange
Act.61
In summation, the district court rejected defendants' arguments for
scienter because scienter would not further the policy of section 14(a).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970), popularly known as section 11 of the 1933 Act, provides in
relevant part:
(c) In determining, for the purpose of paragraph (3) of subsection (b) of this
section, what constitutes reasonable investigation and reasonable ground for belief,
the standard of reasonableness shall be that required of prudent man in the man-
agement of his own property.
Id. § 771, popularly known as section 12 of the 1933 Act provides in relevant part:
(2) and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know,
and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omis-
sion.
58. Id. § 78i, popularly known as section 9 of the 1934 Act provides in relevant part:
(e) Any person who wilfully participates in any act or transaction in violation of
subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section shall be liable to any person who shall pur-
chase or sell any security at a price which was affected by such act or transaction
See section 18(a), :d. § 78r.
59. 351 F. Supp. at 859.
60. See, e.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946); see dis-
cussion m note 26 supra.
61. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1970).
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The court assumed that scienter, like absolute liability would not
properly motivate directors to carefully scrutinize proxy materials.
NEGLIGENCE
Having rejected scienter and absolute liability the district court
held:
The appropriate standard of conduct as supported by lower court
opinions and the rationale and language of the proxy statute and
rule is one of liability for negligence. Thus an individual who par-
ticipated in a solicitation which utilizes materially false or mislead-
ing statements is liable if he knew or should have know that the
statements were false or misleading. 62
In applying this standard the court noted that factors such as the in-
dividual's position within the corporation and his access to the per-
tinent information will be considered.63 This allows a court to
distinguish between the corporate director or officer who solicits
proxies on behalf of the "insiders," and a shareholder, holding no
corporate office, who solicits proxies for a particular position. The
shareholder probably does not have as much access to corporate infor-
mation as does the director. This implies that what may be negligence
for a director may not be negligence for a shareholder.
Applying the negligence standard, the district court held that
Ludwig and Kroger were liable because they knew that the contro-
verted statements were false and misleading, and would have known
that the McLean Industries proxy materials were false or misleading
had they read them.4 To hold directors liable for their negligence in
informing shareholders of a pending merger and the surrounding facts
is a logical extension of the traditional rule requiring directors to
exercise due care irf corporate affairs. If directors and officers conduct
corporate affairs in a negligent manner they are liable to the corpora-
tion and its shareholders.0 In the instant case, the directors sent proxy
materials to the shareholders of McLean Industries to explain the
merger of McLean Industries and Reynolds and to solicit support. If
the court would have applied the traditional rule the issue would have
been whether the proxy solicitation by the McLean Industries directors
62. 351 F. Supp. at 860.
63. Id. at 865.
64. Id. at 867-68.
65. See W FI.ErCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS §§ 1029-64 (1965).
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was a concern of the corporation, McLean Industries. The court could
have reasoned that the affairs of a corporation include the duty to
inform the shareholders of a pending merger, and the duty to inform
them accurately. This is a concern of the corporation because of its
obvious importance to all individuals concerned. It involves the very
existence of the corporation. The reason for the traditional rule is that
the directors stood in a fiduciary position towards the corporation and
the shareholders.66 Thus, they were required to act with due diligence,
and were responsible for their lack thereof.67 The district court stated
that the directors, Ludwig and Kroger, held a position of fiduciary trust
towards the plaintiff Gould.68 Thus, the court could have relied on
the traditional reasoning to justify its negligence standard. The district
court, however, chose negligence because it felt negligence would fur
ther the disclosure policy of section 14(a) by providing an incentive to
carefully scrutinize proxy materials. 69 Presumably the incentive is the
avoidance of liability by acting with reasonable care.
In addition to Borak and Mills, the district court cited four district
court opinions to support its decision.
In Richland v. Crandall,70 the court, in comparing rule 14a-9 with
rule lOb-5, noted that section 10(b) uses language associated with an
intent to defraud ("manipulative or deceptive device") but that section
14(a) does not use such language. Because of this, the court charged
the jury that the defendants would be liable if they knew or should
have known about the misstatements. The jury, however, found that
the proxy statements were accurate. Rzchland's entire discussion of
section 14(a) and rule 14a-9 was only in comparison to section 10(b)
and rule lOb-5. The court's entire discussion of section 14(a), contained
in a footnote, focused only on the reason not to choose scienter, rather
than the reasons for negligence. 71 In Norte v. Huffines,72 the district
66. Id.
67 Id.
68. 351 F. Supp. at 865.
69. Id.
70. 262 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). This case involved shareholders' action against
corporate directors and officers attacking sale of assets on the ground that the stock-
holders' approval of the sale was obtained fraudulently. The shareholders alleged violations
of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, and section 14(a) and rule 14a-9. The jury, however, found
that the proxy materials were accurate.
71. Id. at 553.
72. 304 F Supp. 1096 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd n part, 416 F.2d 1189 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970). This case was derivative suit against the corporate directors
alleging fraudulent exchange of stock. Plaintiff claimed there were violations of sections
10(b) and 14(a) and rules lOb-5 and 14a-9. The court held for the plaintiffs.
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court stated that actual knowledge of the false statements is not needed
in an action under section 14(a). The court did not explain why- it
simply stated the rule. The court, however, found that the defendants
knew about the false statements3 3 The Norte court s discussion of
section 14(a) covered only three lines of the printed opinion.74 In
Berman v. Thompson,75 the district court stated:
To relieve defendants of liability because they may have exercised
good faith and honest business judgment in not disclosing the in-
formation would not be in furtherance of the statutory policy of
full disclosure.76
The Berman court did not decide whether the defendants had acted
with intent, or negligently or were strictly liable. The opinion dealt
more with the materiality of the omissions than with the issue of con-
duct. Since the court held defendants liable without stating whether a
negligence standard or absolute liability applied, this case could also
be cited to support a strict liability standard. The only reference to the
issue of conduct was the court's disapproval of the defense of good
faith.7" Good faith was rejected without an explanation of what good
faith entailed. In Gerstle v. Gamble7 the district court felt that negli-
gence is sufficient for recovery of damages under section 14(a), but it
found that the defendants acted with intent. In reaching its decision
that negligence is sufficient, the court noted that the purpose of section
14(a) is to protect corporate suffrage so shareholders can make an
informed choice.79 The Gerstle court, however, failed to discuss how a
negligence standard would serve the purposes of section 14(a). Rather,
the court focused on the reasons not to choose scienter. By this reason-
ing the court chose negligence by negative implication; since scienter
is not required, negligence should be used.
These four cases are not persuasive precedent for a negligence stand-
73. 304 F Supp. at 1108, 1110.
74. Id. at 1109-10.
75. 312 F Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ill. 1970). Tins case was derivative suit against the corpo-
rate directors alleging violation of the proxy rules. The court granted plaintiffs' motion
for summary judgment against the corporate officers and directors. The opinion dealt
mostly with the meaning of materiality.
76. Id. at i035.
77. Id.
78. 298 F Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). This was an action by minority stockholders charg-
ing that merger was brought about through the use of false and misleading proxy
solicitation. The court decided the case under 14(a) rather than 10(b) because 14(a) spe-
cifically deals with proxy solicitations. The defendant directors were held liable because
they knew the proxy materials were false.
79. Id. at 95-97.
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ard. First, they failed to discuss in depth the basis for choosing such a
standard. Richland and Gerstle focused on the reasons not to choose
scienter, and did not give definitive arguments for negligence. Second,
Norte found that the defendants acted with intent; Gerstle found that
the defendants acted with intent; and m Richland the jury found that
the proxy statements were accurate. Thus, these three cases are factually
dissimilar to the present case, and their reference to the issue of conduct
can be characterized as only dicta. Third, Berman did not clearly re-
veal which standard it applied to hold defendants liable. The Berman
court did reject the defendants' argument that they could avoid lia-
bility by proving they acted in good faith; however, it is not clear
whether the court used a negligence or strict liability standard. Addi-
tionally, the Berman court did not define good faith.
CONCLUSION
The Borak Court, in stating that "the possibility of civil damages
serves as a most effective weapon in the enforcement of the proxy re-
quirements,"80 suggested a cause and effect relationship: the possibility
of civil damages will cause one to comply with the proxy requirements.
The instant case restated this casual relationship in this manner: the
possibility of civil damages due to negligent conduct will cause one to
carefully scrutinize the proxy materials.s To arrive at this conclusion,
the district court posed the question regarding which standard-scien-
ter, negligence, or absolute liability-would best further the disclosure
policy by providing an incentive for directors to scrutinize the proxy
materials.8 2 This district court is the first to discuss this issue (standard
of care) at length.83
The court stated that the directors held a position of fiduciary trust
towards the plaintiff.84 Therefore, the court could have reasoned that
the directors, as fiduciaries, were required to act with due diligence in
disclosing information to the shareholders. This would have been an
application of the traditional rule holding corporate directors to a
reasonable man standard.85 The court could have reasoned that section
80. 377 US. at 432.
81. 351 F. Supp. at 859, 865.
82. Id.
83. Compare 351 F. Supp. 853 with the cases discussed in notes 70, 72. 75, & 78 supra.
84. 351 F. Supp. at 865.
85. See note 65 supra.
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14(a) and rule 14a-9 require an accurate proxy solicitation, that a proxy
solicitation is a concern of the corporation, and that directors, as fidu-
ciaries, should have used reasonable care in disclosing information to
the shareholders. This approach would have followed the analysis used
by the New York Court of Appeals in Diamond v. Oreamuno.86 In
Diamond, the directors used inside information to purchase stock for
their own benefit. The directors held the corporate stock for more than
six months, therefore they did not violate section 16(b) of the 1934 Ex-
change Act.8 7 However, the court of appeals held that the directors'
conduct violated their common law fiduciary duty owed to the corpora-
tion. Diamond applied the standards and policy of section 16(b) to de
fine the common law fiduciary duty, even though section 16(b) was not
violated.ss In the instant case, the court could have held that the com-
mon law provided the general standard of care and that section 14(a)
and rule 14a-9 provided specific reference to one of the duties required
of the fiduciaries. Instead, the court analyzed the issue by asking which
standard would best further the policy of section 14(a).
While a negligence standard may be desirable because it will allow
shareholders to recover their damages without having the heavy burden
of proving that the proxy solicitors acted with intent, will a negligence
standard in fact cause directors to carefully scrutinize proxy materials?
The major weakness of the district court's analysis is that it assumes
that directors will respond in a specific manner to the negligence
standard. The court stated this assumption; it did not explain why such
a result would occur. It did not cite any empirical evidence to support
its cause and effect relationship. In addition, the court did not discuss
how a negligence standard would affect non-directors. The court's
holding referred to any individual, yet the court did not say how a
negligence standard would affect the typical shareholder who does not
hold corporate office. Will a negligence standard affect both groups in
the same manner? Will a person who owns a few shares in a corporation
86. 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
87. 15 US.C. § 78p (1970), popularly known as section 16 of the 1934 Act, provides in
relevant part:
(a) Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10
per centum of any class of equity secunty (b) For the purpose of preventing the
unfair use of information which may have been obtained by such beneficial owner,
director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by
him from any purchase and sale, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an
exempted security) within any period of less than six months shall inure to and
be recovered by the issuer
88. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
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be willing to involve himself in the corporate affairs by setting forth
his views and proposals through a proxy solicitation if he may be liable
for negligence? The court did not find it necessary to address itself to
these questions. The court did state that in applying the negligence
standard factors such as the person s access to corporate information
would be considered.8 9 Thus, what may be negligence for a director
may not be negligence for a shareholder.
That directors may act more carefully because of a negligence stand-
ard, rather than scienter or absolute liability is not disputed. Criticism
may, however, be directed at the reasoning used to reach this conclu-
sion. In using a cause and effect approach, the district court discussed
only one variable (civil liability) which might affect directors' be-
havior. The court failed to discuss other factors. For example, it has
been suggested by Professor Conrad. that professional ethics is the most
important and pervasive force for maintaining a high standard of
conduct for directors. 90 The court did not discuss the effects, if any,
of professional ethics. Another factor to consider is the effect of liability
insurance. It has been suggested that liability insurance removes an
important stimulus (fear of paying for damages) from the exercise of
due care.91 Professor Conrad, though, has suggested that eliminating
liability insurance would deter responsible persons from assuming
corporate directorships. 92 Insurance may alter the cause and effect re-
lationship, but the court did not discuss the effects, if any of liability
insurance. Another factor to consider is the effect of criminal liability.
Section 32(a) of the 1934 Exchange Act provides that wilful violations
of the 1934 Exchange Act can be punished by fine and imprisonment.93
It can be argued that it is the function of section 32(a) to deter viola-
tions of the 1934 Exchange Act, and therefore a negligence standard
under section 14(a) is not needed to supplement the deterrence func
tion of section 32(a). The court did not discuss the effects, if any of
section 32(a).
Some commentators agree with the district court's reasoning.94 For
89. 351 F Supp. at 865.
90. See Conrad, Functions of Directors Under the Existing System, 27 Bus. Lwy. 30, 32
(1972).
91. See Comment, Insuring Corporate Executives Against Liability Under Rule 10b-5.
First Principles and Second Thoughts, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 544 (1968).
92. See Conrad, A Behavioral Analysis of Director's Liability for Wegligence, 1972 Du"x
L.J. 895.
93. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1970), popularly known as section 32(a) of the 1934 Act.
94. See generally Falk, Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The Bar
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example, Milton Cohen, in evaluating the 1933 Securities Act (which
bases liability on negligence), stated that the liability provisions have
created an extraordinarily high sense of care and responsibility in the
preparation of the registration statement.95 Cohen favors amending
section 18(a) of the 1934 Exchange Act to allow for the defense of
reasonable care instead of the present good faith standard. While
Cohen may be correct in concluding that the liability provisions, based
on negligence, caused the high sense of care, he did not, and probably
could not, prove that it was the liability provisions which caused the
improvement in directors' behavior. Like the district court, Cohen
seems to believe in a cause and effect relationship, even though he did
not prove its existence.
The major weakness of the arguments regarding the effect of civil
liability on behavior is that the analysis is based on an unproven as-
sumption: that behavior is affected by the fear of civil liability 96 The
present case further compounds this unproven assumption by adding
to it another unproven assumption: that the fear of civil damages due
to negligence will have a specific effect, i.e., provide the directors with
an incentive to carefully scrutinize proxy materials.97 This is analogous
to stating that the purpose of criminal law is to encourage socially ac
ceptable conduct by punishing socially unacceptable conduct.9 It is
difficult enough to measure what effect if any, criminal laws, such as
the death penalty, have on human behavior.99 How reliable, then, is
the assumption that civil liability will cause directors to carefully scru-
tinize proxy materials?1°°
To determine what effect civil liability due to negligence would have
Chris Case, 55 VA. L. REv. 1-82, 199-271 (1969); Comment, Negligent Misrepresentation
Under lOb-5, 32 U. CmI. L. REV. 824 (1965).
95. See Cohen, Truth in Securities Revisited. 79 HARv. L. REv. 1340, 1355, 1361 (1966).
96. But see Pans Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). The majority opimon by
Chief Justice Burger stated:
From the beginning of civilized societies, legislators and judges have acted on various
unprovable assumptions. Such assumptions underlie much lawful state regulation of
commercial and business affairs The same is true of the federal securities, anti-
trust laws, and host of other federal regulations.
Id. at 61.
97. 351 F. Supp. at 859, 865.
98. See R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 4 (1969).
99. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 314 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). See gen-
erally Erlich, The Deterrent Effect of Criminal Law Enforcement, 1 J. LEcAL STuDIEs 259
(1972); Phillips & Votey, An Economic Analysts of the Deterrent Effect of Law Enforcement
on Criminal Activity, 63 J. CuM. L.C. & P.S. 330 (1972).
100. See R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM 248,




on directors' behavior, the above factors, in addition to civil liability,
should be considered. If a court is to decide how a standard of care
affects behavior, then the court should ideally be able to consider evi-
dence from all interested parties. The court would have to consider
evidence from directors, from shareholders, from the Securities and
Exchange Commission, from the accountants and lawyers who prepare
the proxy materials, from behavioral psychologists, and others. This
raises the question of whether a court is a proper forum for speculation
on the effect of civil liability on behavior. If the standard of care is to
be chosen on the basis of how proxy solicitors will react to civil liability
regarding their scrutiny of proxy materials, then the issue should be
resolved by Congress, or the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Congress, or the Securities and Exchange Commission, can hear evidence
from all the diverse interested parties, not just the litigants and amicus
curiae. Congress, or the Securities and Exchange Commission, has the
time and the expertise to study the problem in depth. A court may not
be able to give the problem the necessary time and consideration be-
cause of the crowded dockets and rules of procedure regarding evidence
and joinder of parties. A legislative decision on the standard of conduct
would apply nationwide, thus avoiding the inconsistencies which may
result from the various district courts adopting different standards. It
can be argued, though, that Congress has already acted by enacting the
1933 and 1934 Acts and that it is now up to the courts to interpret and
adapt these statutes to the current problems. It can also be argued that
the various district courts, by experimenting with different standards,
can find the most appropriate standard. But if the standard of care does
in fact affect directors' behavior, there should be a definite, uniform
standard, similar to section 11 and section 12 of the 1933 Securities
Act.10 1 If Cohen is correct in concluding that section 11 and section 12
have caused directors to act more carefully then it can be argued that
this is so because section 11 and section 12 provide definite standards
regulating conduct.102
Well-known commentators, such as Louis Loss and Milton Cohen,
have advocated legislative action regarding civil liability for violations
of the Securities Acts.10 3 Loss has proposed a Federal Securities Code to
cover civil liability and fraud.1°0 Such a code would harmonize the van-
101. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771 (1970).
102. See note 95 supra.
103. See Garrett, Conference on Codification, 22 Bus. LwY. 793 (1967).
104. Id. at 795.
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ous conflicting sections of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. 10 5 For an example
of this conflict, assume there is a false or misleading proxy solicitation.
The shareholder can sue those responsible for the solicitation under
section 14(a). If a merger has occurred then the shareholder can also sue
under section 10(b) because he has "sold" his shares for shares in the
new corporation.10 6 If he sues under 10(b) he may have to prove that
defendants acted with scienter. 10 7 If he sues under 14(a) he may have
to prove only negligence. 08 There is also the question of whether
18(a) should apply in either a 10(b) or a 14(a) suit involving a false or
misleading proxy solicitation. If 18(a) applies, the shareholder will have
to prove reliance on the false or misleading document. 0 9 But the
Supreme Court in Mills held that reliance is satisfied if the shareholder
proves-that he defect in the proxy solicitation is material."0 If 18(a)
applies, the defendants have to prove they acted in good faith; if 10(b)
governs, plaintiffs may have to prove that defendants acted with sci-
enter- if 14(a) governs, plaintiffs may have to prove that defendants
acted negligently. If the above is not confusing enough, the question of
the statute of limitations may be added. Section 18(a) provides for a
definite time in all 18(a) cases;"' in 10(b) cases the courts usually apply
the state statute of limitations regarding fraud, and this may differ from
the time prescribed by section 18(a). For 14(a) suits it is not clear what
statute will be applied."12
The present case is a good example of the need for codification. De-
fendants' arguments for a scienter standard were based on analogies,
t.e., that 14(a) is analogous to 10(b), and that rule 14a-9 is analogous to
lOb-5. Defendants were forced to make these arguments because of the
scarcity of case law on the standard of care required under 14(a). The
cases cited by the district court are the only ones which discuss the is-
sue of standard of care under 14(a). If the disclosure policy is impor-
tant in effectuating the shareholders' exercise of their right to vote, the
legal standard which may affect this policy should be clear and definite.
The present decision sets forth a negligence standard, but a strong
105. See Heinkiel, Codification: Civil Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws, 22
Bus. Lwy. 866, 867 (1967).
106. See the discussion in note 50 supra.
107. See the discussion in note 40 supra.
108. See, e.g., Gould v. American Hawauan SS. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853 (D. Del. 1972).
109. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1970).
110. See the discussion in note 15 supra.
111. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1970).
112. See Loss, supra note 13, at 1771-92.
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argument can be made that defendants in fact acted with scienter.113
Is this decision then also dictum, as the cases-cited by the district court
were dicta?114 After this-decision by the district court in Delaware, how
wifll other district courts decide this issue? Will there be the same con-
fusion and conflict which now exists under 10(b)?115
The district court, by rejecting the extremes of scienter and absolute
liability, reached a fair decision. In this .case shareholders recovered
their'damages without having to prove that defendants acted with sci-
enter. The directors could have avoided liability by proving they used
reasonable care. In making this decision, the district court followed
Borak and Mills and'added a necessary ingredient to the federal com-
mon law1"( of securities regulation. Borak created the cause of action,
Mills clarified one, element .of the cause of action (causation), and the
present case defined another element of the cause of action: standard of
care.
CHRISTOPHER LEPORE
113. See the discussion in note 20 supra.
114. 351 F Supp. at 864.
115. See the discussion in note 40 supra.
116. For discussion of federal common law, see C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL CouRTs 247-53
(2d ed. 1970).
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